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The Impact of Shopbot Use on Prices and Price Dispersion: 
Evidence from Online Book Retailing 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
The growth of Internet price search tools, notably shopbots, has reduced consumers’ 
search costs, allowing consumers to easily become informed of price and product 
characteristics among competing sellers online. While a variety of analytic models 
predict that increased consumer search through shopbots will lower price levels among 
competing retailers, there is no consensus in the empirical literature as to whether price 
dispersion will increase or decrease in response to increased consumer search through 
shopbots. Moreover, there are no papers that have analyzed this question using direct 
observation of variation in shopbot use over time. 
This paper seeks to examine the impact of changes in shopbot use over time on pricing 
behavior in the Internet book market. Using price data obtained from a leading shopbot, 
combined with clickstream data on shopbot usage from August 1999 to July 2001, we 
show that an increase of 1% in shopbot use is correlated with a $0.41 decrease in price 
levels, after controlling for book characteristics and the market competition condition. 
We also show that price dispersion decreases with shopbot use nonlinearly. This 
relationship is robust when we control for potential simultaneity bias and the possible 
influence of prominent retailers, bestsellers, holiday effect, and online book industry 
structural changes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: Search Cost; Shopbot; Clickstream; Internet; Price Dispersion 
2 
1. Introduction 
Shopbots are software intelligent agents that automatically query multiple on-line 
vendors to gather information about prices and other attributes of products at a given 
point in time, and usually make the information free to the consumers (Smith 2002). In 
this way, shopbots act as a central “clearinghouse”, where firms and consumers gather to 
transmit and acquire information (Baye and Morgan 2001). Consumers can typically 
purchase by clicking one of the hyperlinks on a shopbot’s page to be directed to 
individual stores.  
Shopbots greatly reduce search costs for consumers. While a variety of analytic models 
predict that increased shopbot use will lead to decreased price levels among retailers, 
there is no consensus in the literature as to whether increased shopbot use will decrease 
price dispersion (through increased competition among firms) or increase price dispersion 
(through increased use of mixed strategy pricing). Moreover, due to data limitations there 
have been very few papers that have analyzed this question empirically,1 and none that 
we are aware of that use direct observation of variation in shopbot use over time. 
This research seeks to fill this gap in the literature by analyzing the impact of changes in 
shopbot use over time on the pricing behavior in the Internet book market. By combining 
price data obtained from an Internet shopbot with clickstream data on shopbot usage from 
August 1999 to July 2001, we are able to show how reduced search cost influences online 
book retailers’ pricing behavior, and therefore, the market competition. 
                                                 
1 Notable exceptions include Sorensen (2000) with regard to search intensity for pharmaceuticals, Brown 
and Goolsbee (2002) with regard to the introduction of Internet for term life insurance, and Baye, Morgan, 
and Scholten (2004a) with regard to the influence of the number of firms on price dispersion. 
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We study books — well-defined homogenous goods, with low marginal cost, in a 
relatively mature Internet market (Smith 2000). Books can be identified by their ISBNs 
and they have limited but easily comparable features. Most factors that may influence the 
purchase of a book can be associated with prices and can be easily quantified. Our book 
search data were collected from Dealtime.com, one of the most popular Internet shopbots 
for books during our study period. The data set contains information with regard to the 
total price of books (and the elements of the prices) and the characteristics of the books. 
We compute the shopbot usage measure from a clickstream dataset collected through 
Media Metrix’s PC Meter. Clickstream data refer to the sequence of WWW URLs or 
pages visited and the time these pages were viewed. We have individual level clickstream 
data recorded daily during a five-year period from July 1997 through May 2002, from 
which we can calculate several measures of shopbot usage, for example, the percentage 
of people who use a shopbot and the percentage of people who use a book shopbot, with 
the latter more specific to book shoppers. We then map the shopbot usage data with our 
Dealtime data according to the time that a search occurred and examine the possible 
impact of search behavior on book prices. 
The results show that after controlling for book characteristics and the market 
competition condition, an increase in shopbot use of 1% results in a $0.41 decrease in 
price levels. We also find that price dispersion decreases with shopbot use nonlinearly. 
Finally, we find that the number of prominent retailers that offer a book negatively 
influences prices and price dispersion. These results are not driven by the pricing 
strategies of prominent retailers, bestseller discount, holiday effect, and possible 
structural changes of online book industry. These results shed light on the dynamics 
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between consumer search behavior and retailer pricing strategies and provide empirical 
confirmation for the predictions of several analytic models.  
The rest of the paper is organized as the following. In Section 2, we review the relevant 
literature. In Section 3, we state our hypotheses. In Section 4, we describe the data. In 
Section 5, we show the empirical results. In Section 6 we consider alternative 
explanations of the results. Section 7 concludes with discussion and future directions. 
2. Literature Review 
Our work follows the economics literature on the impact of search on prices and price 
dispersion. Following Stigler (1961), several analytical papers have examined the impact 
of search costs and asymmetric information on equilibrium prices and price dispersion. A 
common assumption in this literature is that some consumers do not know the price 
distribution, while other consumers do. Under this assumption, equilibrium price 
dispersion can arise in a homogenous goods market with symmetric firms. Notable 
papers in this literature include Varian (1980), which finds equilibrium price dispersion 
in the context of sales: stores randomize prices in an attempt to price discriminate 
between informed and uninformed consumers. Stahl (1989) “endogenizes” the 
consumers’ decision to be informed or uninformed by assuming that some consumers 
have positive search costs, while others have zero search costs. Under a sequential search 
game, price dispersion arises as an equilibrium outcome. The comparative statics are 
informative to the current research. It shows the relationship between prices and price 
dispersion and the parameters of the model: the proportion of informed consumers and 
the search cost. We expand on these comparative statics in Section 3.  
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Chen and Hitt (2004) incorporate two sources of price dispersion, limited awareness and 
brand sensitivity, to address the inconsistencies between the predictions of the search 
literature and the empirical findings in the Internet market. They find that average prices 
in the market are reduced as consumers become better informed. They also find that price 
dispersion may increase before most consumers are informed about prices. The search 
theory provides theoretical guidance for our empirical findings. 
Sorensen (2000) establishes the empirical importance of price dispersion due to costly 
consumer search. By examining local retail prices for prescription drugs, he finds that 
prices for repeatedly purchased prescriptions (for which the benefits of search are 
highest) exhibit significant reductions in both dispersion and price-cost margins. 
In the context of the Internet, Baye and Morgan (2001) examine the equilibrium 
interaction between a market for price information controlled by a gatekeeper (e.g., 
shopbot) and the homogenous product market it serves. They show that the gatekeeper’s 
profit is maximized in equilibrium where the product market exhibits price dispersion. 
Iyer and Pazgal (2003) also analyze the effect of shopbots on retail competition. Their 
focus is on the Internet retailers’ decision of whether to join shopbots. The results 
indicate that the prices charged by inside retailers can vary substantially. The average 
prices charged by inside retailers can increase or decrease when more retailers join, 
depending on whether or not the reach of the shopbot is independent of the number of 
joining retailers.  
Our paper builds on the search literature by conceptualizing consumers who use shopbots 
as informed consumers, and consumers who do not use shopbots as uninformed 
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consumers. Informed consumers incur a cost to visit shopbots and learn the price 
distribution. Uninformed consumers only visit an individual seller’s website, and 
therefore do not know the whole price distribution. Similar conceptualization has been 
used by Brown and Goolsbee (2002) in studying the impact of the introduction of Internet 
on term life insurance prices. 
Despite the extensive literature on search theory, there have been relatively few empirical 
studies of price and price dispersion in the online markets. Notable exceptions include 
Brynjolfsson and Smith (2000), who find that while prices on the Internet are lower than 
prices in conventional outlets, price dispersion is higher on the Internet than in 
conventional outlets. Baye, Morgan, and Scholten (2004a) examine price dispersion of 
multiple products on a price comparison site. They find that price dispersion is greater 
when a small number of firms list prices than when a large number of firms list prices. 
Baye, Morgan, and Scholten (2004b) find significant variation in the identity of the low-
price firms as well as the level of the lowest price for best-selling consumer electronics 
products sold at a price comparison site. Interestingly, their studies cover similar, 
although shorter, time period as the current research. 
The most relevant empirical literature to our work is Brown and Goolsbee (2002), who 
study the impact of Internet on the offline life insurance prices and price dispersion. Their 
findings indicate that rising Internet usage reduces term life insurance prices. Price 
dispersion increases with the initial introduction of the Internet search sites, but as the 
share of people using the technology rises further, dispersion falls.  
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The current paper differs from Brown and Goolsbee’s work in that we are able to directly 
measure changes in price levels and price dispersion based on observation of variation in 
shopbot use over time. Our data also differ from much of the extant literature in that our 
observed products come directly from actual consumer searches as opposed to coming 
from a “random” sub-sample of books in print as in common in the literature. This use of 
direct observation of consumer product searches provides us with a more representative 
sample of books than much of the extant literature. 
3. Theory and Hypotheses 
The central hypothesis of this paper is that since using shopbots reduces search costs and 
helps consumers discover and compare prices more easily, increased adoption of 
shopbots should influence retailers’ pricing strategy. As discussed above, a variety of 
search theory models have predicted the impact of search costs on price distribution. The 
IS literature has also established the existence of price dispersion in the online market. In 
this section, we will mainly use the predictions from the literature to form our 
hypotheses. 
The search literature usually assumes a homogeneous product market with multiple 
stores. Some consumers search with zero cost, while others incur a positive search cost c. 
The consumers with positive search cost are relatively uninformed and therefore will buy 
from the first store with the price below their reservation price. Consumers with zero 
search cost search all the stores and buy from the store with the lowest price. In 
equilibrium, stores will charge a price drawn from a distribution (Varian 1980, Stahl 
1989). The setting can be easily extrapolated to the Internet book market: Online 
bookstores compete for book consumers; some consumers visit shopbots to compare 
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prices before purchase, while others go to individual book retailers’ websites directly to 
purchase. If we assume the consumers who use shopbots can obtain all price listings and 
therefore purchase at the lowest price, then the shopbot users will be the zero-search-cost 
customers. Both the search theory and IS literature predict that when the search cost 
decreases, prices would become more competitive. Our first hypothesis follows directly 
from this prediction. 
HYPOTHESIS 1. Prices decrease in shopbot use. 
Essentially in Hypothesis 1, we use the percentage of consumers who use shopbot as a 
proxy for informed consumers — the more the informed consumers, the more 
competitive the market is, therefore retailers need to drop prices. 
By similar arguments, when more consumers search, retailers are more likely to engage 
in price competition, undermining their profitability. In fact the search theory literature 
predicts that products for which consumers are more likely to compare prices should have 
lower price-cost margins (Sorensen 2000). Therefore, we should expect that price margin 
is negatively related to shopbot use. Thus we have the following hypothesis: 
HYPOTHESIS 2. Price-cost margins decrease in shopbot use. 
Our next hypothesis is with regard to price dispersion. It has been established in the IS 
and economic literatures that, although the Internet may lower consumer search costs, 
price dispersion still exists (e.g., Brynjolfsson and Smith 2000, Clay, Krishnan, and 
Wolff 2001). This is reasonable as, on one hand, when more consumers use shopbots to 
search products and compare offerings, the competition among retailers drives their 
prices toward the competitive price, therefore price dispersion may decrease. While, on 
the other hand, because retailers face a less profit margin overall, they will try to exploit 
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more profit from uninformed consumers by charging higher prices to uninformed 
consumers, which will increase price dispersion. Thus price dispersion can either increase 
or decrease in the presence of lower search costs or increased search intensity. 
The above analysis is also consistent with what is predicted in the search theory literature, 
which finds that when the proportion of zero-search-cost customers approaches to zero, 
the Nash Equilibrium price distribution converges to the monopoly price; when the 
proportion of zero-search-cost customers approaches to one, the price distribution 
converges to the competitive price (Stahl 1989). This implies that price dispersion 
changes non-monotonically with the proportion of the informed customers. Therefore, we 
expect: 
HYPOTHESIS 3. Price dispersion is non-monotonic in shopbot use. 
Not only does price dispersion vary with buyer search costs, but it also varies with market 
structure, for example, competition. The online bookselling market is highly concentrated, 
with Amazon.com representing approximately 70% of total market share (Ehrens and 
Markus 2000). Together with BarnesandNoble.com and Borders.com, the big three 
retailers (Big 3) dominate the online bookselling market. In our data, more than 98.3% of 
the search results contain at least an offer made by the top three retailers. Due to the 
concentration, the top three retailers may serve as a focal point for consumer search. 
Because of this, “Big 3” retailers may attempt to undercut each other’s prices, which will 
intensify competition, leading to lower prices and lower price dipsersion. Thus, we 
formulate the following two hypotheses as: 
HYPOTHESIS 4. When more Big 3 retailers list their prices, prices decrease. 
HYPOTHESIS 5. When more Big 3 retailers list their prices, price dispersion decreases. 
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4. Data 
To analyze the relationship between the shopbot use and price and price dispersion, we 
take individual search-level data from Dealtime.com on the prices of books as well as 
various book characteristics and market competition conditions and match this data to 
data on the growth of shopbot use as tracked by clickstream data obtained by 
MediaMetrix. We then fit a hedonic regression for the price levels and price dispersion of 
books on how likely consumers conduct a search using shopbots, including 
characteristics of the books and the market competition conditions. 
Data on Book Prices  
The data on book prices come from actual book search by Dealtime.com consumers from 
August 25, 1999 to July 25, 2001. Dealtime.com is a shopbot that queries up to 60 book 
retailers and returns price and availability information in a tabular format (Figure 1). We 
agregate this data into individual sessions, which we define as a search on a specific book 
identified by an ISBN. Within each session we observe the date and time that the search 
occurred, the ISBN of a book, the total price and its components (item price, shipping 
cost, and sales taxes if applicable), and the retailers who carry that book.  
We augment the Dealtime data with two additional data sets. The first is book 
characteristics obtained from Bowker’s Books in Print: binding type (hardcover or 
paperback), book category, and publisher’s list price. The second is whether a book was 
listed on the New York Times bestseller list on the date the prices were provided. 
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Data on Shopbot Use 
Our shopbot use measures are computed from a clickstream data set collected through 
Media Metrix’s PC Meter. The PC Meter is a program that records information about 
who is using a computer, what applications are running or URLs are being viewed, and 
how long they are in use.2 Clickstream data refers to the sequence of URLs or pages 
visited and the time these pages were viewed. Media Metrix collects the clickstream data 
from a nationwide panel of over 20,000 individuals during a five-year period from July 
1997 through May 2002. 
Media Metrix categorizes websites according to their functions. For the purpose of this 
research, we compile four categories of website lists according to Media Metrix’s 
definitions: retailing sites, online bookstores, shopbots, and book shopbots. Because the 
categories defined by Media Metrix do not match our lists exactly, we compile our lists 
by taking the broadest definition. That is, if Media Metrix defines different categories of 
shopbots, we include all of these categories in our list of shopbots. Because Media Metrix 
revises their definitions of categories during our analysis period, in case a conflict occurs 
in their early and later definitions, we take the most recent one as we compile our lists. 
We define book shopbots and general purpose shopbots in the following way. All book 
shopbots3 list books as one of their major search categories. In contrast, general purpose 
shopbots do not feature book price search per se, instead these shopbots typically focus 
on broader search categories such as, gifts and travel. Frequently, people can still search 
for books by using a general purpose shopbots. However, the key word “Books” is most 
                                                 
2 For a detailed discussion on Clickstream data, see Montgomery (1999). 
3 Shopbots, such as, Dealtime.com, Bottomdollar.com, Pricescan.com, and MySimon.com are categorized 
as book shopbots. 
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often put in a less important position, sometimes, not directly observable from a main 
page. We define retailing sites and online bookstores in the following way. Retailing sites 
are mainly online shopping sites; while online bookstores include book retailers’ web 
sites, such as BarnesandNoble.com. They also include publishers’ sites, such as 
www.bottomlinesecrets.com (for Bottom Line Publications) and book clubs sites, such as 
www.bomc.com (for Book-of-the-Month Club).  
We use these data to compute two measures of shopbot use. The proportion of people 
who use shopbots in a given month is computed by dividing the percentage of people 
who use a shopbot by the percentage of people who visit a retailing site in a given month; 
The proportion of people who use a book shopbot is computed by dividing the percentage 
of people who use a book shopbot by the percentage of people who visit an online 
bookstore in a given month. Each percentage is computed based on whether a user visited 
any of the domains associated with one of the four categories during a month. Essentially 
the first measure is the shopbot usage of general online shoppers and the second measure 
is more specific to book shoppers. The time period covered by the data, August 1999 to 
July 2001, is a particularly important time period as the Media Metrix data show a 
dramatic increase in shopbot use from 7.2% in August 1999 to 16.3% in July 2001 and an 
increase in book shopbot use from 11.9% to 25.4% during the same period (Figure 2). 
The dataset contains prices and price dispersion measures for 75,765 searches conducted 
by U.S.-based customers.4 Key summary statistics are provided in Table 1. The data 
show a significant dispersion in prices. 14.8% of the sessions have a difference between 
the highest and lowest offers exceeding the list price. 65.5% of sessions have the 
                                                 
4 We eliminate international searches because our shopbot measure is constructed for U.S. consumers. 
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difference exceeding $10. The average difference between the maximum item price and 
minimum item price per session is $19.1 which corresponds to 57.2% of the average item 
price per session. The number of retailers offering a book also varies from a minimum of 
2 retailers to a maximum of 21 retailers, with an average of 11 retailers offering a book. 
Almost always the Big 3 retailers offer a book being searched. 98.3% of the search 
results contain at least an offer made by the Big 3 retailers. 56.5% of the time all the top 
three retailers make an offer. 
5. Basic Model and Results 
5.1. Price Levels 
Our main interest is on the proportion of book shoppers who use book shopbots as 
defined above.5 The following variables are included to control for their influences on 
prices. Wholesale price is included to control for the cost that may attribute to different 
prices. We calculate the wholesale price of the book as 53% of the list price following the 
prior literature (Brynjolfsson, Hu, and Smith 2003) and thus this variable can also be 
interpreted as a scaled version of list price. We include control variables for the book type 
including the genre of the book (CATID), its binding type — paperback, hardcover (HC), 
or other media (OTHERMED). We also include a dummy variable indicating whether the 
book was on the New York Times bestseller list at the time the price quotes were 
provided. This controls for the fact that New York Times bestsellers are typically offered 
at significant discounts and may have different competitive dynamics than other titles do. 
Finally, we include two variables to count for the competition coming from the Big 3 
online booksellers (NUMBIG3) and from the other retailers as well (NUMPR).  
                                                 
5 The results are similar if we use the proportion of shoppers who use shopbots. 
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The price level regression is specified as follows: 
(1)                                                              
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The subscript s identifies unique sessions. To ensure the model is robust to symmetric 
non-normality in the disturbances we computed Huber/White/sandwich estimator of 
variance for the coefficient estimates (Huber 1967, White 1980). 
The results are shown in column 1 of Table 2. As noted above, both the search theory and 
IS literature uniformly suggests that prices should fall with increased shopbot use. The 
results confirm this prediction. The coefficient on shopbot use is negative and statistically 
significant, suggesting that an increase in shopbot use is associated with a drop in prices. 
In particular, when shopbot use increases 1 percent, prices fall $0.41. Therefore, we 
accept Hypothesis 1. Without surprise, when the wholesale price increases, prices also 
increase. 
Most of the signs on the control variables in this regression are consistent with 
expectations. Participation of the big 3 retailers has a negative impact on the price. When 
the number of Big 3 retailers offering a book increases 1, the average price falls about 
$2.30. Thus Hypothesis 4 is supported. Prices also go down as more other competing 
retailers offer the same book. The competition from the Big 3 retailers has a much larger 
impact on prices than competition from other retailers did. If a book is in a binding 
format other than paperback or hardcover, for example a CD-ROM, prices are lower, 
thought the coefficient is statistically insignificant. Interestingly, average prices for New 
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York Times bestsellers are not lower than other books. This result seemingly contradicts 
the traditional view that retailers often offer large discount to New York Times 
bestsellers. To further investigate the problem, we run (1) according to different book 
categories. We find that for some categories of books, such as art books, New York 
Times bestsellers do have lower average prices. However, for other categories of books, 
such as religion books, New York Times bestsellers do not have lower prices. In the 
sample, more books fall into the latter categories. Subsequent analysis in Section 6 shows 
that the Big 3 retailers do discount NYT bestsellers and charge lower prices, but the 
smaller retailers do not follow this strategy. 
In the second column of Table 2, we add two yearly dummies to control for the fact that 
prices may drop over time. Coefficients on the two dummies clearly indicate this trend. 
However, book shopbot use still has a negative impact on the prices, with the magnitude 
of the rest of the coefficients varying very slightly. 
5.2. Price Margins 
To examine Hypothesis 2, we use similar specification as in the price level regression. 
Price margin is calculated by subtracting the wholesale price from the item price. As 
noted above, we use the wholesale price as a proxy for the cost of the online book 
retailers and it is shown to be accurate (Brynjolfsson, Hu, and Smith 2003). Column 3 of 
Table 2 shows the results. The results indicate that price margin falls $0.27 with an 
increase in shopbot use of 1 percent. Thus, Hypothesis 2 is supported. Also note that 
competition leads to decreased price-cost margin. When more of the Big 3 retailers offer 
the product, the margin falls. This is also true in general when more retailers offer the 
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same book. The impact of the former on price-cost margin far exceeds that of the latter, 
indicating the dominance of the Big 3 retailers on the online bookselling market. Perhaps 
the lower price margin of the Big 3 retailers can be compensated through larger sales 
volumes. 
5.3. Price Dispersion 
The results of price dispersion are summarized in Table 3. We start by using the standard 
deviation of price per session as the measure for price dispersion. The square of the 
shopbot use measure is included to allow for possible nonlinearity. Column 1 of Table 3 
reports the result. Among all the variables that explain price dispersion, the shopbot use 
variable provides the highest explanatory power. The significance of the coefficient of 
the shopbot use and the coefficient of the square of shopbot use point to the fact that the 
impact of shopbot use on price dispersion is nonlinear. The plot of estimated price 
dispersion against the shopbot use (Figure 3) shows that price dispersion decreases with 
shopbot use nonlinearly. The general decreasing trend is accompanied by small 
fluctuations. 
The most natural explanation for the observed relationship between shopbot use and price 
dispersion is that when more people search, the increased awareness of prices intensifies 
competition, which leads to the falling price dispersion. This explanation seems to apply 
to most of the data. However in the long run this pricing strategy might not last, because 
it damages the profitability of the retailers. Some retailers may deviate from “the law of 
one price” by experimenting with other pricing strategies. Therefore we observe the small 
fluctuations along the general decreasing trend. Thus Hypothesis 3 is not supported. 
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The results also indicate that when there are more Big 3 retailers offering a book, price 
dispersion decreases. The competition among the top retailers tends to decrease the price 
difference. The evidence supports Hypothesis 5. The same is not true for all retailers. 
When more retailers sell a book, price dispersion increases. One explanation for this is 
that smaller retailers tend not to engage in price competition. They may make profit using 
a variety of strategies, for example, by charging relatively higher prices for some books 
and lower prices for other books. Including more “smaller” retailers introduces more 
diverse prices. Together with the observed nonlinearity, the different pricing strategies of 
the Big 3 retailers and the smaller retailers may reveal that initially when the percentage 
of people who use shopbot increases, the smaller retailers follow the big retailers pricing 
strategies closely to lower prices. Therefore price dispersion falls. However, for the 
smaller retailers, when the percentage of people who use shopbot continues to increase, 
unlike the big retailers, the lost profit cannot be compensated by the sales volume. At this 
point, the smaller retailers have to begin experiments with other pricing and non-pricing 
strategies. Therefore, occasionally we observe increased price dispersion. 
We use several alternative measures of price dispersion from the literature to test the 
robustness of the above results. Our results are shown in Column 2-5 of Table 3. Column 
2 lists the results using range, which is the difference between the highest and the lowest 
prices. Column 3 uses the difference between the average and minimum price as the 
dispersion measure. Column 4 uses the ratio between the range and the minimum price as 
the dispersion measure. Column 5 uses the difference between the two lowest prices as 
the dispersion measure. Different measures capture the underlining price distribution 
differently. For example, unlike the other measures which all reflect the whole price 
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distribution to some extent, the difference between the lowest two prices assigns more 
weight to low prices. If consumers who use shopbot to search are more price sensitive, 
lower prices will generate more sales than higher prices. Therefore, this measure can be 
seen as a quantity-weighted measure of price dispersion (Baye, Morgan, and Scholten 
2004a). 
The results with respect to the book shopbot use and the competition from the top 
retailers are robust across price dispersion measures: when the proportion of consumers 
who use book shopbot increases, price dispersion decreases nonlinearly; when more Big 
3 retailers sell a book, price dispersion falls. These findings are against Hypothesis 3. 
Nonetheless Hypothesis 5 is supported. 
For most of the measures, price dispersion increases as more retailers offer the book, with 
the exception when we use the difference between the lowest two prices as the measure. 
Since this measure tends to weigh low prices more, the result indicates that perhaps 
retailers who usually charge lower prices are more actively engaged in price competition, 
so when more retailers provide the same book, the low price retailers compete by 
undercutting each others’ prices until the price gap shrinks. Overall, retailers seem to take 
different strategies. They either engage in price competition by charging lower prices or 
try to compensate small sales volumes by occasionally charging higher prices. 
6. Alternative Explanations 
While our results may indicate that an increase in shopbot use leads to decreased prices 
and price dispersion, there are a variety of alternative explanations that could indicate 
19 
spurious correlation or reverse causality. We explore these alternative explanations in this 
section. 
6.1. Pricing Strategies of Prominent Retailers 
One potential alternative explanation is that during our analysis period, prominent 
retailers, such as Amazonc.om, BarnesandNoble.com, and Borders.com, may have 
changed their pricing strategies and that these price changes — not changes in shopbot 
use — influence price levels and price dispersion. 
A direct test of this hypothesis is to exclude the Big 3 retailers from the sample. We run 
the same price and price dispersion regression excluding data from the Big 3 retailers.6 
The results are shown in column 1 and 2 of Table 4. The coefficients still show the same 
effect of shopbot use and competition on price and price dispersion, with all the other 
coefficients having the same signs as before. Thus, our findings seem to be robust to 
changes in Big 3 pricing. 
As a further test, we also run the same regression including only data from the Big 3 
retailers. The results are shown in the last two columns of Table 4. The average prices 
and price dispersion both decrease with book shopbot use, but with smaller magnitude 
than those in the full sample. This result is intuitive — though the use of search tools 
drives down the prices and price dispersion of the Big 3 retailers, these retailers have a 
disproportionate number of “loyal” customers and are not influenced by these changes as 
much as the smaller retailers are.  
                                                 
6 From now on, we use standard deviation of prices in the price dispersion regression. Results are similar if 
we use other measures of price dispersion. 
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We also note that the Big 3 retailers charge lower prices for NYT bestsellers than other 
retailers do. While the Big 3 retailers only offer slightly deeper discount in general 
(9.1%), they offer much higher discount for the NYT bestsellers (26.6%). Next, we 
examine the possible impact of the NYT bestsellers on the retailers pricing strategies. 
6.2. Bestseller Discount 
Another alternative explanation for our results is that the pattern of price level and price 
dispersion we observe may be driven by the prices of New York Times (NYT) 
bestsellers, because NYT bestsellers represent high aggregate sales and are a focal point 
for discounts (Clay, Krishnan, and Wolff 2001). As a general check of this explanation, 
we note that the average discount off list price for all the books in our sample is 8.3%, 
while the average discount for NYT bestsellers is only slightly larger at 10.8%. Further, 
only about 9% of our sample comes from bestsellers.7 Given these facts, the magnitude of 
the influence of NYT bestsellers on our results is likely to be small. 
As a formal test, we remove NYT bestsellers from the sample and run the same 
regressions. The results are shown in column 1 and 2 of Table 5. The results continue to 
show that price and price dispersion decrease with shopbot use. Although removing 
bestsellers makes the price drop less dramatic, price level still decreases and the change is 
statistically significant. The coefficient on shopbot use in the price dispersion regression, 
however, is larger in magnitude without the NYT bestsellers: -5.4 versus -4.8 for the first 
order effect and 8.4 versus 7.3 for the second order effect. It is interesting to see that 
                                                 
7 9,405 out of a total of 106,467 titles. 
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online booksellers do not set similar prices for NYT bestsellers — by removing the 
bestsellers, price dispersion drops even more when shopbot use increases. 
6.3. Holiday Effect 
It could be argued that during the end-of-year holiday season online booksellers offer 
larger discounts to promote sales, which leads to decreased prices and price dispersion. 
This could influence our results if simultaneously holiday shoppers are more likely to use 
shopbots for comparison shopping. As a straightforward check, the trend of monthly 
average prices, price dispersion, and shopbot use in Figure 2 and Figure 4 does not seem 
to support this argument — while shopbot use increases during the holiday season, 
average price and price dispersion do not always decrease during the same period of time. 
To analyze this alternative explanation further, we remove all observations from 
December and run the same regressions as in the basic model. The results are shown in 
column 3 and 4 of Table 5. The coefficients still show the same effect of shopbot use and, 
if anything, are larger than before in the price regression: the coefficient on shopbot use is 
-43.4, compared with -41.3 before. In the dispersion regression the coefficients on 
shopbot use are similar: -4.7 versus -4.8 before for the first order effect and 7.4 versus 7.3 
for the second order effect. Meanwhile the number of Big3 retailers that sell a book still 
has a negative impact on the average price and price dispersion. Therefore the results do 
not seem to be driven by the holiday discount. 
6.4. Structural Changes in the Online Book Market 
One potential structural change in the book market during our time period is the number 
of firms operating in the market. Prior research has used the number of firms posting 
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prices at the shopbot as a proxy for overall market competition (Baye, Morgan and 
Scholten 2004a, Clay, Krishnan, and Wolff 2001). In the regressions we include two 
variables to control for the structural changes in the online book market. One is the 
number of retailers that list prices. This variable can be seen as reflecting the overall 
market competition. Because of the high concentration of the online book retailing, we 
also include another variable the number of Big 3 retailers that list prices to control for 
the impact of the prominent sellers on prices and price dispersion. We have seen that 
“Big 3” retailers may play a more important role in influencing the prices and price 
dispersion than other retailer do. The difference between the two coefficients may be due 
to the different pricing strategies between the Big 3 retailers and smaller retailers. 
The second source of structural change can be the change of the degree of concentration 
of the online book market. As has been widely observed, the Internet book market is 
heavily concentrated, with Amazon.com commanding more than 70% of the total market 
share (Ehrens and Markus 2000) and BarnesandNoble.com and Borders.com representing 
a large fraction of the remaining market. However, we observe insignificant changes in 
the concentration during our study period. Moreover, we have shown in Section 6.1 that 
our results persist even if “Big 3” prices are removed. To the extent that the degree of 
concentration of the online book retailing market is largely determined by the Big 3 
retailers, removing them will rule out the price change directly brought by the Big 3 
retailers.  
The third possible structural change could relate to systematic changes in wholesale 
prices. For this, we refer to Ghose, Smith, and Telang (2005), which has pointed out that 
book industry wholesale prices are set as a fraction of list prices and this fraction has not 
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changed in recent years. We have also included wholesale prices in the price regression 
to control for its influence on price change. 
6.5. Book Industry and Macroeconomic Factors 
From the book industry’s perspective, book prices may drop if demand decreases. 
However, neither domestic consumer expenditures on books nor publishers’ sales in 
terms of dollars and units vary significantly during this period. Domestic consumer 
expenditures on books went from $10.8 billion dollars in 1999 to $11.1 billion dollars in 
2001. Similarly, publishers’ sales went from $23.8 billion dollars in 1999 to $24.6 billion 
dollars in 2001 (Book Industry Trend 2003). 
From the perspective of the economy as a whole, macro-economic factors, such as 
inflation, may also influence prices. To test for this, use monthly CPI as the deflator to 
compute book prices in real dollars and run our price regressions using the CPI adjusted 
prices.8 The results are shown in column 5 of Table 5. We note that all the coefficients 
have the same sign as in the regression using raw prices. In particular, the coefficient on 
shopbot use is -40.7 versus -41.3 before. Thus, although adjusting for inflation lowers the 
impact of shopbot use slightly, it does not change the results overall. 
6.6. All Effects 
Finally, we consider all of the alternative explanations together. We do this by excluding 
prices from bestsellers, prices quoted from Big 3 retailers, and prices from the holiday 
season, and then adjusting the prices to the real prices. The results are shown in Table 6. 
                                                 
8 We only test for the impact of inflation on price levels since price dispersion is not influenced by the use 
of nominal or real prices. 
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In the price regression, the coefficient of shopbot use is still negative and significant. In 
the price dispersion regression, shopbot use has a larger impact on price dispersion once 
all effects are considered and the signs on the coefficients are the same as before. Thus, 
considering all the alternative explanations simultaneously, the basic results we find in 
Section 5 still hold. 
6.7. Time Trend and Lagged Effect 
We have shown that increased shopbot use on the part of consumers is correlated with 
reduced price levels and reduced price dispersion in the same time period. However, we 
also note that the relationship between shopbot use and prices may merely due to a time 
trend: shopbot use increases over time and prices and price dispersion decrease over time. 
If this is true, we cannot claim a causal relationship between shopbot use and prices.  
To deal with these issues, we need to consider the lagged effect of shopbot use on prices 
and price dispersion and to remove the time trend in the series. Autoregressive 
Distributed Lags model (ADL) (Hanssens and Liu 1983) helps to deal with both issues. 
To use the ADL model, we first need to identify the appropriate number of lags to 
include in the price and price dispersion regressions and to remove the time trend on the 
shopbot usage time series.9 
The ADL model includes lagged endogenous and exogenous variables to examine how 
the exogenous variables affects the time path of the endogenous variable. In the context 
of our model, the exogenous variable is shopbot usage and the endogenous variable is 
                                                 
9 Note that including lagged shopbot usage variables will also capture any factors that would cause changes 
in shopbot usage to have a delayed impact on price levels and price dispersion (e.g., the impact of dispos-
able income on consumption, and R&D investment on profitability). 
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price or price dispersion. This technique has been used in a variety of setting including 
the influence of the use of fluorocarbons on the ozone layer (Enders 2004).  
A typical ADL model has the following form: 
yt = a0 + A(L)yt−1 + C(L)zt + B(L)εt  (2) 
where tz is the exogenous variable, ty is the endogenous variable, and tε is a white-noise 
disturbance. A(L), B(L), and C(L) are polynomials in the lag operator L. The goal is to 
estimate the parameter 0a  and the parameters of the polynomial A(L), B(L), and C(L). 
ADL models assume that }{ tz  is an exogenous process that evolves independently of the 
}{ ty  sequence, such that 0=−sttEz ε  for all values of s and t. Since tz  can be observed, and 
is uncorrelated with the disturbance term tε , the current and lagged values of tz  can be 
used as explanatory variables for ty .  
To employ this model, we first use the exogenous (shopbot usage) and endogenous 
(price) variables in the ADL model to determine how many lags of shopbot use should be 
included in the price and price dispersion regressions. In doing so, price levels and price 
dispersion are transformed in a monthly level to match the monthly shopbot use variable. 
The augmented Dickey-Fuller test on shopbot usage, prices, and price dispersion 
indicates that the shopbot use series is non-stationary while prices and price dispersion 
are stationary. Therefore, we take the first difference of the shopbot use series to 
eliminate its trend. 
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We then follow the procedures specified by Enders (2004) to identify the correct number 
of lags for the exogenous, endogenous variables, and the error term in (2). The price 
regression takes the following form: 
tt ShopbotUseaaiceAvg Δ+= 10Pr  (3) 
where the subscript t indicates months. We then use the result of (3) and include the 
lagged shopbot use after detrending in the basic price regression model (1): 
                    
3Pr
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         (4) 
where the subscript t indicates months and s indicates sessions. 
A similar procedure is used to determine the lag structure in the price dispersion 
regression. The results of both regressions are shown in Table 7. The results show that 
prices decrease with an increase in shopbot use, even after controlling for the upward 
trend of the shopbot use. Increasing shopbot use by 1 percent decreases the price level by 
approximately $0.45. Price dispersion decreases with the increase of shopbot use 
nonlinearly, even after controlling for the time trend and lagged effect of shopbot use. 
The coefficients on shopbot use are similar to the ones in the basic results. Interestingly 
shopbot use not only influences price dispersion directly through a simultaneous effect, 
but also indirectly through the lagged effect. This lagged effect may reflect the amount of 
time retailers take to identify the increased search and adjust their pricing strategies. 
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7. Conclusions and Future Research 
The impact of increased consumer search in Internet markets has been a subject of much 
debate in the literature. While there have been a variety analytic models that have made 
predictions about the impact of increased shopbot use, there have been far fewer 
empirical studies of the impact of shopbot use on retailers prices — and none that have 
used direct observation of changes in shopbot use over time. 
To overcome this problem, we combine two datasets. One documenting price levels and 
price dispersion for a representative sample of books that consumers have searched for, 
and second using clickstream data documenting shopbot usage levels by a representative 
panel of consumes. Our results show that as shopbot usage increases prices decrease and 
price dispersion decreases nonlinearly. We also show that as more prominent online book 
sellers offer a book, prices and price dispersion fall. Overall our results suggest that the 
increased use of shopbots empowers consumers and intensifies the competition of the 
online book retailing. 
These relationships are robust to including different measures of price dispersion and the 
possible influence of prominent retailers, bestsellers, holiday effect and certain industry-
wide as well as macroeconomic factors. These results are also robust to including lagged 
effect of shopbot use on prices and price dispersion to control for possible simultaneity 
bias. The results  the change of shopbot use and the change of the prices and price 
dispersion may reflect the amount of time retailers take to adjust their pricing strategies. 
Our findings are largely consistent with the prediction of the extant search theory 
literature. The research falls into a broader line of literature documenting the relationship 
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between intensified search and market competitiveness. Future research could study 
consumer search behavior in greater details, for example, by using daily level search data. 
As the use of Internet search tools become prominent, similar techniques can be applied 
to the study of other product markets, where other features in addition to prices matter for 
competition.
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Table 1. Summary Statistics August 25, 1999-July 25, 2001 
Variable 
 
Mean  S.D. Min Max 
List Price 33.82 
 
34.76 1.20 994.61 
Average Item Price 32.41 
 
35.81 1.33 995.03 
Tax 0.21 
 
1.12 0 72.43 
Shipping Price 3.62 
 
1.48 0 93.85 
% shopbot usage 0.16 
 
0.03 0.07 0.25 
% book shopbot usage 0.25 
 
0.04 0.11 0.36 
NYT Bestseller 0.10 
 
0.30 0 1 
Number of Big3 2.43 
 
0.74 0 3 
No. Retailers per session 11.02 
 
3.83 2 21 
N 75,765 
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Table 2. Price Level and Margin 
 Average Price 
 
Average Price 
 
Price Margin 
%Book Shopbot 
Use 
-41.347* 
(2.504) 
 
-18.081* 
(2.719) 
-26.945* 
(2.430) 
Wholesale price 1.674* 
(0.015) 
 
1.678* 
(0.015) 
– 
Year 00 
 
– -7.084* 
(0.525) 
 
– 
Year 01 
 
– -10.308* 
(0.499) 
 
– 
NYT Bestseller 2.777* 
(0.262) 
 
2.345* 
(0.255) 
0.178 
(0.264) 
Number of Big 3 
Retailers 
-2.347* 
(0.116) 
 
-3.537* 
(0.177) 
-3.175* 
(0.141) 
Number of Retailers -0.520* 
(0.0043) 
 
-0.387* 
(0.025) 
-0.881* 
(0.028) 
Other binding -0.537 
 (0.354) 
 
-0.570 
(0.355) 
3.158* 
(0.516) 
Hardcover -0.711* 
(0.181) 
 
-0.916* 
(0.181) 
6.311* 
(0.152) 
Dummies Categories 
 
Categories 
 
Categories 
 
Adjusted R-Square 0.784 
 
0.788 0.160 
N 75,765 
 
75,765 
 
75,765 
 
Note: * significant at p=0.01. All category dummies are significant at p=0.01. 
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Table 3. Price Dispersion Regression 
 Standard 
Deviation 
 
Range 
 
Difference 
between 
Average 
and 
Minimum 
Price 
Range 
Over 
Minimum 
Price 
Difference 
between 
Two 
Lowest 
Price 
 
%Book Shopbot Use 
 
-4.783* 
(0.138) 
 
 
 
-626.355* 
(22.068) 
 
-341.382* 
(14.645) 
 
-62.280* 
(2.233) 
 
-290.865* 
(14.775) 
(%Book Shopbot 
Use)2 
 
 
7.300* 
(0.250) 
 
979.492* 
(39.467) 
527.615* 
(26.026) 
92.541* 
(3.906) 
448.870* 
(26.240) 
NYT Bestseller 0.029* 
(0.002) 
 
 
-1.601* 
(0.328) 
-0.359 
(0.238) 
-0.108** 
(0.044) 
0.533** 
(0.235) 
Number of Big 3 
Retailers 
-0.031* 
(0.001) 
 
 
-5.052* 
(0.157) 
-2.483* 
(0.103) 
-0.438* 
(0.021) 
-2.054* 
(0.112) 
Number of Retailers 0.008* 
(0.000) 
 
 
0.878* 
(0.030) 
0.321* 
(0.020) 
0.165* 
(0.004) 
-0.244* 
(0.023) 
Other binding 0.004 
(0.003) 
 
 
2.745* 
(0.460) 
1.242* 
(0.294) 
-0.129* 
(0.052) 
0.207 
(0.291) 
Hardcover 0.006* 
(0.001) 
 
 
7.724* 
(0.176) 
3.330* 
(0.116) 
-0.054** 
(0.025) 
1.359* 
(0.116) 
Dummies Categories 
 
 
Categories 
 
Categories 
 
Categories 
 
Categories 
 
Adjusted R-Square 0.164 
 
 
0.129 0.082 0.107 0.065 
N 75,765 
 
 
75,765 
 
75,765 
 
75,765 
 
75,765 
 
Note: * significant at p=0.01. ** significant at p=0.05. *** significant at p=0.1. 
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Table 4. Possible Impact of Big 3 Retailers 
 Average 
Price 
 
(Excluding 
Big3) 
Price 
Dispersion 
 
(Excluding 
Big3) 
Average 
Price 
 
(Big3 Only) 
Price 
Dispersion 
 
(Big3 Only) 
 
%Book Shopbot 
Use 
 
-31.817* 
(2.817) 
 
 
 
-5.676* 
(0.155) 
 
-10.758* 
(1.426) 
 
 
 
-9.932* 
(0.294) 
 
(%Book Shopbot 
Use)2 
 
 
– 
 
 
 
 
9.059* 
(0.274) 
 
– 
 
 
16.558* 
(0.504) 
Wholesale price 1.668 * 
(0.027) 
 
 
– 1.786* 
(.009) 
 
 
– 
NYT Bestseller 2.180* 
(0.240) 
 
 
0.014* 
(0.002) 
-1.871* 
(0.107) 
 
 
-0.011* 
(0.002) 
 
Number of Big 3 
Retailers 
– 
 
– 
 
-1.130* 
(0.079) 
 
-0.014* 
(0.001) 
 
 
Number of 
Retailers 
 
-0.690* 
(0.029) 
 
 
0.006* 
(0.000) 
– 
 
– 
 
Other binding -0.103 
(0.353) 
 
0.007** 
(0.003) 
0.682* 
 (0.212) 
 
 
0.008** 
(0.003) 
Hardcover -0.036 
(0.276) 
 
 
0.002 
(0.001) 
-0.338* 
(0.097) 
 
 
0.010* 
(0.001) 
Dummies Categories 
 
 
Categories 
 
Categories 
 
 
Categories 
 
Adjusted R-
Square 
0.817 
 
 
0.161 0.939 
 
 
0.124 
N 73,096 
 
 
73,096 
 
66,734 
 
66,734 
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Table 5. Possible Impact of Bestsellers, Holiday Effect, and Inflation 
 Average 
Price 
(Excluding 
Bestseller) 
Dispersion 
 
(Excluding 
Bestseller) 
Average 
Price 
(Excluding 
Holiday 
Season) 
Dispersion 
 
(Excluding 
Holiday 
Season) 
Real Average 
Price 
 
%Book Shopbot 
Use 
 
-30.665* 
(2.610) 
 
 
-5.390* 
(0.155) 
 
-43.377* 
(3.668) 
 
-4.744* 
(0.168) 
 
-40.697* 
(2.456) 
(%Book Shopbot 
Use)2 
 
– 8.392* 
(0.273) 
– 7.424* 
(0.316) 
– 
Wholesale price 1.672* 
(0.015) 
 
– 1.697* 
(0.025) 
 
– 1.668* 
(0.015) 
 
NYT Bestseller – – 2.312* 
(0.256) 
 
0.032* 
(0.002) 
2.717* 
(0.255) 
Number of Big 3 
Retailers 
-2.009* 
(0.118) 
 
 
-0.033* 
(0.001) 
-2.120* 
(0.118) 
-0.029* 
(0.001) 
-2.254* 
(0.112) 
Number of 
Retailers 
 
-0.516* 
(0.024) 
0.008* 
(0.000) 
-0.427* 
(0.025) 
0.008* 
(0.000) 
-0.507* 
(0.023) 
Other binding -0.217 
(0.358) 
 
0.008** 
(0.003) 
-0.153 
(0.338) 
0.005*** 
(0.003) 
-0.529 
(0.344) 
Hardcover -0.367*** 
(0.191) 
 
0.008* 
(0.001) 
-0.280  
(0.259) 
0.003* 
(0.001) 
-0.668*  
(0.177) 
Dummies Categories 
 
 
Categories 
 
Categories 
 
Categories 
 
Categories 
 
Adjusted R-
Square 
0.797 
 
 
0.161 0.127 0.198 0.776 
N 69,701 
 
 
69,701 
 
71,980 71,980 75,765 
Note: CPI adjusted wholesale price is used in the last column. 
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Table 6. All Effects  
 Real_Average 
Price 
  
Price 
Dispersion 
 
%Book Shopbot Use 
 
 
-27.009* 
(3.833) 
 
-6.050* 
(0.216) 
(%Book Shopbot Use)2 
 
– 9.893* 
(0.402) 
Wholesale price 1.697* 
(0.029) 
 
– 
NYT Bestseller – 
 
 
– 
Number of Big 3 
Retailers 
 
– – 
Number of Retailers -0.507* 
(0.023) 
0.007* 
(0.000) 
 
Other binding 0.652** 
(0.317) 
 
0.004 
(0.003) 
Hardcover 0.330 
(0.284) 
 
0.002** 
(0.001) 
Dummies Categories 
 
Categories 
 
 
Adjusted R-Square 
 
0.863 0.193 
N 63,494 
 
63,494 
Note: In Column 1, CPI adjusted wholesale price is used. 
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Table 7. Lagged Effects 
 
 Average Price 
 
  
Price 
Dispersion 
 
%Book Shopbot 
Use 
 
 
-44.558* 
(2.369) 
 
-4.463* 
(0.194) 
(%Book Shopbot 
Use)2 
 
– 7.371* 
(0. 330) 
Δ%Book 
Shopbot Use 
 
45.009* 
(2.993) 
– 
L4(Δ%Book 
Shopbot Use) 
 
– 0.083* 
(0.012) 
Wholesale price 1.688* 
(0.013) 
 
– 
NYT Bestseller 2.348* 
(0.255) 
 
0.042* 
(0.001) 
Number of Big 3 
Retailers 
 
-2.929* 
(0.118) 
-0.023* 
(0.001) 
Number of 
Retailers 
-0.424* 
(0.023) 
0.009* 
(0.000) 
 
Other binding -0.559 
(0.348) 
 
0.003 
(0.003) 
Hardcover -0.704* 
(0.173) 
 
-0.002* 
(0.001) 
Dummies Categories 
 
Categories 
 
 
Adjusted R-
Square 
 
0.799 0.212 
N 74,914 
 
66,332 
Note: CPI adjusted prices and wholesale prices are used. Δ (%Book Shopbot Use) =(%Book Shopbot 
Use)t-(%Book Shopbot Use)t-1, t indicating a month. In L4(Δ %Book Shopbot Use), L is the lag operator. 
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Figure 1. Sample Dealtime Webpage 
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Figure 2. Monthly Change of Shopbot Use 
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Note: PctBot is the percentage of shopbot use. PctBookBot is the percentage of book shopbot use. 
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Figure 3. Nonlinear Effect of Shopbot Use on Price Dispersion 
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Figure 4. Monthly Change of Price and Price Dispersion 
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